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ABSTRACT
With the League o f Nations’ inability to maintain mternational peace and security the 
Allied Powers o f the Second World War began to work on the creation o f an 
international organization that would be more efficient and powerfiil in matters o f 
international peace and security. Therefore, in 1945 the United Nations was 
established. The system envisaged in the United Nations Charter for the maintenance 
o f international peace and security bore some resemblance to the League o f Nations 
system, but this time the authority to decide on matters o f international peace and 
security was given to a smaller body, that is, the Security Council. However, the 
Korean War, which was the first case that the United Nations used its enforcement 
powers showed that the system o f collective security as envisaged in the United 
Nations Charter would not work in the future because o f the Cold War divide. In order 
to overcome the stalemate in the Security Council and fulfill its primary responsibility, 
that is, maintenance o f international peace and security the United Nations conducted 
peacekeeping operations which were not envisioned in the United Nations Charter but 
rather was a response to the deadlock in the Security Council. During the Cold War, 
although the task o f peacekeeping was limited to containing local or re^onal conflicts 
so as to prevent the escalation o f them into major wars where the two superpowers 
would confront each other with the relaxation o f Cold War tensions towards the end o f 
the 1980s peacekeeping began to acquire new tasks and responsibilities. With the 
cooperation o f the superpowers in the Security Council the United Nations, after forty 
years could again use its enforcement powers to revert Iraqi aggression against 
Kuwait. Therefore, with the end o f the Cold War the superpowers were again able to 
cooperate which opened the way for new peacekeeping operations with 
multidimensional tasks in order to end long-lasting conflicts.
ÖZET
Milletler Cemiyeti’nin dünya banşının ve güvenliğinin sağlanmasında başansız olması 
sonucunda İkinci Dünya Savaşı’mn müttefik devletleri dünya banşı ve güvenliği 
konularında daha etkili ve güçlü olabilecek bir uluslararası organizasyon yaratma çabası 
içine girdiler. Böylece 1945’te Birleşmiş Milletler kuruldu. Dünya banşı ve 
güvenliğinin sağlanması için Birleşmiş Milletler’in öngördüğü sistem Milletler 
Cemiyeti’nin sistemiyle benzerlik gösterse de bu defa uluslararası banş ve güvenliği 
igilendiren konularda karar verme yetkisi daha küçük bir merciye. Güvenlik Konseyi’ne 
verilmişti. Fakat Birleşmiş Milletler’in zorlayıcı önlemlere başvurduğu Kore Savaşı 
göstermiştir ki Birleşmiş Milletler’in Anayasasında öngörülen kollektif güvenlik sistemi 
Soğuk Savaş nedeniyle gelecekte işlemez olacaktır. Böylece, Birleşmiş Milletler 
Güvenlik Konseyindeki çıkmazm üstesinden gelmek ve temel sorumluluğu olan 
uluslararası banş ve güvenliği sağlamak için banşı koruma harekatlan düzenlemiştir. 
Banşı koruma harekatlan Birleşmiş Milletler Anayasasmda yer almamış Güvenlik 
Konseyindeki çıkmaza bir tepki olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Soğuk Savaş süresince banşı 
koruma harekatlannın görevi yerel veya bölgesel çatışmaların iki süper gücü karşı 
karşıya bırakacak şekilde büyümesine meydan vermemekle sımrlı olsa da 1980’lerin 
sonlannda Soğuk Savaş gerginliklerinin yumuşamasıyla birlikte banşı koruma 
harekatlan yeni sorumluluklar üstlenmişlerdir. Güvenlik Konseyinde iki süper gücün 
işbirli^ sayesinde kırk yıl sonra ilk defa zorlayıcı önlemler kullanılmış ve Irak’ın 
Kuveyt saldınsı geri püskürtülmüştür. Böylece, Soğuk Savaş’m bitmesiyle birlikte iki 
süper güç tekrar işbirliği içine girmiştir ki bu da uzun süreden beri devam eden 
çatışmalara son vermek için çok boyutlu banş harekatlannın düzenlenmesini 
sağlamıştır.
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FROM THE KOREAN WAR TO THE GULF CRISIS:
A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
(1950-1991)
INTRODUCTION:
In 1942, shortly after the United States had entered the Second World War, 
preparations began for the establishment o f a new international organization to replace 
the League o f Nations. The League, although failed to prevent the outbreak o f another 
World War, was the first global attempt aimed at maintaining international peace and 
security. Taking lessons from the failure o f this global organization, the Allied powers 
o f the Second World War began to work on post-war arrangements for the 
establishment o f the “United Nations” (UN) the name o f which was devised by United 
States President Franklin D. Roosevelt. ‘ With the end o f the Second World War the 
United Nations Charter officially came into existence on 24 October 1945.
The Security Council was to be the decision-making organ o f the UN. Composed o f 
five permanent members with the veto power and ten non-permanent members^ 
Chapter VII o f the UN Charter empowered the Security Council to determine ‘the 
existence o f any threat to the peace, breach o f the peace, or act o f aggression’ and to 
decide on what measures to take. A Military Staff Committee, composed o f the Chiefs 
o f Staff o f the Permanent Members o f the Security Council would stand ready to 
advise and assist.
The concept o f collective security seemed quite well on paper, however, when 
intended to put into practice the members o f the UN faced one great obstacle that 
could not be predicted during and right after the war. Drafters o f the UN Charter 
"assumed a general and equal interest in the preservation o f the status quo post bellum. 
Change would be possible, but only by general consent. The post-war world was 
conceived, in fact, in somewhat static terms. However, the post-war world order was 
going to be far more different than the drafters o f the Charter had expected. The 
coming years were signaling the beginning o f a new era, that is, the Cold War where 
the world would be divided into two ideologically rival blocs, between democracy and 
communism. Such a great power disunity reflected itself well enough in the UN 
Security Coimcil and soon the Organization became deadlocked speaking in terms of 
executing its primary mission; the maintenance o f international peace and security. 
Either the United States or the Soviet Union blocked any action against their own 
spheres o f influence. Such a deadlock in the Security Council was first overcome in 
1950 with the ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’ during the Korean War the details o f 
which will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Shortly after the Korean War the ‘improvised’"' response to the Suez crisis o f 1956 lay
the foundations o f a new role for the UN not envisioned in the Charter; conducting
‘peacekeeping’ operations. The term ‘peacekeeping’ was not mentioned in the UN
Charter. Rather, it was an innovation, which is sometimes referred to as Chapter six
and a half By peacekeeping we mean
... an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, 
undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and 
security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent
and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, Uk^  achieve their 
otyectives not force of arms, thus contrasting them with the 'enforcement action' of 
the United Nations under Article 42.^
Being the first peacekeeping operation. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), 
provided the precedent for dealing with similar crises in the fiiture. Constrained by the 
Cold War imperatives hence not being able to fulfill its primary purpose the new role 
for the UN turned out to be isolating local conflicts and not allowing them to become 
battlefields where the two power blocs would confront each other.
During the Cold War this was the mechanism that the UN would resort to for 
resolving conflicts. This mechanism worked out quite well, at least successful enough 
not to allow the local conflicts to escalate thus preventing another World War, the 
consequences o f which would be far more ruinous than the previous ones given the 
destructive capacity o f nuclear weapons that both sides acquired; enough to destroy 
the whole world.
Towards the end o f the 1980s, the Cold War period, which seemed to last forever, had 
ended with the collapse o f the communist ideology signaling the beginning o f a new 
era in the international political system. The long lasting confrontation o f the two 
superpowers, which was the main obstacle to the execution o f the UN’s primary 
mission, was replaced by a cooperative mood in the Security Council. With the 
absence o f Cold War struggles the Security Council could now assume more 
responsibility and function more effectively in matters o f peace as intended to do so 
given the prevailing consensus among the Great Powers in the Security Council.
This master's thesis is, therefore, aims to provide a descriptive and anal)ftic historical 
approach to the United Nations peacekeeping operations during the period between 
the Korean War and the Gulf crisis o f 1990. Within this period, because o f the 
ideological rivalry between the Western and the Eastern blocs, the Security Council 
could not utilize its enforcement powers for the settlement o f international disputes. 
The Council resorted to enforcement only in 1950, during the Korean War, where it 
was able to authorize enforcement action against North Korea because o f the absence 
o f the Soviet delegate in the Council. Then for 40 years the Security Council was not 
able to use its enforcement powers, that is, until the Gulf crisis o f 1990. Thus, the 
inability o f the Security Council to fiinction as intended to do so gave birth to a new 
concept for the settlement o f international disputes: peacekeeping.
The point o f departure for this thesis, therefore, will be the analysis the post-World 
War II international circumstances and events which led to the emergence o f 
peacekeeping. Thus, the first chapter is dedicated to the analysis o f the concept o f 
collective security envisaged in the UN Charter and the Korean War which showed 
that the this system would not work in a bipolar world.
The second chapter is tin analysis o f UN peacekeeping in the Cold War era and 
encompasses two UN peacekeeping operations, which are the cornerstones in terms o f 
the evolution o f UN peacekeeping. While the first one demonstrates the success o f the 
UN to overcome international crises under such a rigid international system the second 
one demonstrates the limitations o f this innovation called "peacekeeping". The first
case is the United Nations Emergency Force 1 (UNEF 1) which is the first force level 
peacekeeping operation in the history o f the UN. Established during the Suez crisis o f 
1956 UNEF I is the first UN operation in which the principles o f peacekeeping had 
been laid down. The second operation is the United Nations Operation in the Congo 
(1961), which was one o f the most controversial operations that the UN had embarked 
upon; so controversial that after the Congo operation the UN did not establish another 
peacekeeping operation in Africa until 1989 (in Namibia).
The third chapter is dedicated to the analysis o f UN peacekeeping operations between 
1988 and 1991. The change in the Soviet Union's approach to the UN peacekeeping 
relaxed the tensions in the Security Council and led to the establishment o f new 
peacekeeping operations which put an end to long lasting conflicts in different regions 
o f the world. In addition to that, beyond its traditional tasks the UN peacekeeping 
began to take new responsibilities that distinguished it from the operations that had 
been conducted in Cold War era which also began to include peacemaking as well. 
Thus, the third chapter analyzes five peacekeeping operations that had been conducted 
until the Gulf crisis and demonstrates the changing nature o f UN peacekeeping and 
how it can produce successful outcomes with the cooperation o f the superpowers in 
the Security Council. The last section o f chapter three is dedicated to the analysis o f 
the Gulf Crisis in which the Security Council was able to apply, after 40 years, 
enforcement measures against Iraq given the unprecedented cooperation among the 
members o f the Council. Although not a peacekeeping operation the Gulf crisis is 
worth mentioning because just like the Korean War signaled the beginning o f the Cold
War period the Gulf crisis marked the end o f it. Having been relived from the power 
struggles o f the Cold War period the Security Council could now reassume its 
responsibility in the maintenance o f international peace and security.
CHAPTER 1: The Failure of the CoUective Security System
1. Structuriug a Collective Security System:
While preparing a mechanism for dealing with matters o f international peace and 
security the point o f departure for the drafters o f the UN Charter was the League o f 
Nations experience. Thus, although the League proved unsuccessful in its quest to 
preserve the peace the experiences provided lessons later about how to structure a 
collective security system.^ One o f the most important handicaps o f the League was its 
inability to act collectively in international crises. Unanimity among all members was 
required for action, but members could refiise to take part in League-sponsored 
activities and leave if they chose.^ Such an irresponsible approach to international 
peace and security issues destroyed the very basic premise o f the collective security 
system on which the League’s mechanism was founded upon.Adopting a universalistic 
approach the theory o f collective security requires the commitment o f the entire world 
community to a system in which all states agree to take common action to overcome 
international violence and end the threat to peace.* In other words the security o f one 
is the concern o f all, and each state agrees to join in a collective response to 
aggression.^ The League, however, proved to be incompetent in putting theory into 
practice because it lacked the authority and an effective mechanism o f persuasion to 
impose its decisions upon the members. Subsequent developments, such as the 
incapability o f reversing Japanese aggression against Manchuria and Italian aggression
against Ethiopia, further contributed to the deterioration o f the League’s authority 
leaving it totally powerless with the outbreak o f the Second World War.
Bearing the lessons o f the League experience in mind, the drafters o f the UN Charter
worked on a more efficient and powerful collective security mechanism with effective
enforcement measures. Besides a body involving all members o f the organization a
smaller body would be established which would be responsible for the maintenance o f
international peace and security. The successful cooperation o f the Allied powers
during the Second World War led to the belief that the most effective way to ensure
international peace and security was to have the great powers working together to
combat aggression .T herefore this smaller body would be composed of the United
States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, China, and France which were the victorious
and the most powerful states at the end o f the Second World War. The UN Charter
refers to this body as the Security Council the functions and powers o f which are
outlined in chapter V. The five great powers o f the Security Council are permanent
members having the power to veto decisions.
The permanent members’ veto powers ensure that on important questions they agree, or 
at least abstain. It was recognized that no enforcement action could take place against 
one of the great powers of the international system without creating a major war-the 
very thing that the United Nations had been established to prevent. By preventing action 
against a permanent member, the veto saved the organization from wTccking itself in 
destructive operations against its most powerful members. Enforcement actions [could] 
only be taken with great-power cooperation.''
By virtue o f article 25 all states agree to accept and carry out the decisions o f the 
Security Council. Thus, through the Security Council with mandatory enforcement
powers one o f the main weaknesses o f the League, absence o f collective action, would 
be overcome.
The mechanism for dealing with issues concerning international peace and security has 
been laid down in chapters VI and VII o f the UN Charter. Under article 34 the 
Security Council is authorized to “investigate any dispute, or any situation which might 
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the 
continuance o f the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance o f 
international peace and security” and recommend solutions to the dispute. Through 
Chapter VD the Security Council is entitled to “determine the existence o f any threat 
to the peace, breach o f the peace, or act o f aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain international 
peace and security” and take necessary measures, including military operations, to 
restore international peace and security.
2. The Military Staff Committee:
If the Security Council was to conduct military operations it was to have military 
forces at its disposal. Under article 43 o f the UN Charter the member states undertake 
the responsibility for providing “armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights 
o f passage” through special agreements with the Security Council. Plans for the 
application o f armed force [would] be made by the Security Council with the 
assistance o f the Military Staff Committee (article 46). The Military Staff Committee
would consist o f the chiefs o f staffs o f the permanent members o f the Security Council 
and would be responsible for the stratège direction o f any armed forces placed at the 
disposal o f the Security Council (article 47, par. 3). Between 1946 and 1948 the 
Military Staff Committee worked on the composition, organization and number o f 
military forces.
In August 1948 the Chairman of the Military Staff Committee formally advised the
Security Council that the Military Staff Conunittee had reached a stalemate......... land]
agreement on huther action on a draft form of agreement could not be reached before 
the Military Staff Committee ‘had received instructions from the Security Council 
concerning the divergences noted on some of the General Principles.
By 1946 mutual mistrust between the Soviet Union and the United States had already 
begun to build up each being apprehensive o f the other’s motives and since 1948 the 
Security Council never returned to the Article 43 agreements. Thus, no agreement was 
reached with any o f the members o f the UN and the Military Staff Committee was 
never operationalized. Consequently, the Military Staff Committee became “the first 
victim o f the Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.” ‘^
3. The Korean War and the * Uniting for Peace Resolution’;
Although being an operation not mandated by the UN Security Council the Korean 
War o f 1950 deserves careful iuialysis because o f its radical consequences. Before 
analyzing the consequences some background information would be useful.
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When the Second World War had came to an end Korea was divided into two, with 
Soviet forces occupying the North and US forces, the South. After the Second World 
War the UN efforts to bring about a unified Korea and hold nation-wide elections 
failed due to the refusal o f the Soviets and the communist government o f North Korea 
to cooperate. Therefore, the elections were held only in South Korea (1948) and the 
General Assembly established the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to assist 
Korea in unification o f the country. North Korea, however, continued to defy 
cooperation and in June 1950 the North Korean forces attacked the South.
Acting under Chapter Vlf the Security Council passed a resolution stating that the 
North Korean aggression constituted a breach o f peace. Lacking formal agreements 
with states that are needed to materialize the Military Staff Committee a further 
Security Council resolution was passed “calling] for the establishment o f a unified 
conunand under the United States command to fiimish such assistance to the Republic 
o f Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international 
peace and security in the area.”’“' While these resolutions were passed the Soviet 
delegate, however, was absent in protest o f “Taiwan’s occupation o f the ‘Chinese’ seat 
on the council in spite o f the victory by the Chinese Communists under Mao 
Zedong.” ‘*As soon as the Soviets returned to the Security Council the Council was 
paralyzed and no further action regarding the Korean operation was possible. The 
deadlock in the Security Council was overcome through the ‘Uniting for Peace 
Resolution’ which was passed with the initiatives o f the Western powers (3 November 
1950). The resolution states:
If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members,
(ails to exercise its primary responsibility for (he maintenance of international peace 
and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to peace, breach of the
11
peace, of act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately Avith a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for 
collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or acts of 
aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.'®
The General Assembly required further that all members o f the UN hold armed forces 
ready for action, even if  not formally called upon by the Security Council.*^
The ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’ represents a turning point in the history o f the UN 
in that it demonstrates how the Cold War structure impeded the execution o f the 
Security Council’s primary task. Thus, the General Assembly had to assume 
responsibility for the maintenance o f international peace and seciirity. On the other 
hand, the resolution further contributed to the deepening o f the East-West divide. 
While the Soviet Union argued that the resolution was contrary to the Charter 
principles, that international security was to be maintained through great power 
consensus, the supporters o f the resolution, that is the West, argued that the Security 
Council’s ‘Tormal responsibility for maintaining peace was ‘primary’ but not
‘exclusive’. UK
The Korean affair itself, on the other hand, involves some crucial facts that need to be 
emphasized. First o f all, although conducted under Chapter VII, the Korean operation 
was not a UN operation. It was rather an American operation conducted under the UN 
flag. Thus, the operation was not a practice o f the provisions o f Chapter VII, nor it 
was a collective action. The contributors to the operation were voluntary with the 
United States being by far the largest contributor. The reason for voluntary 
contribution o f troops and logistics was due to the fact that the agreements that were
12
to be concluded between the states and the Military Staff Committee as indicated in 
Article 43 o f the UN Charter were not concluded at all since the Committee came to 
be a superficial body because o f the Cold War divide.
The Korean affair had some profound consequences that influenced the structuring o f 
future security operations as well. First and foremost, it became clear that under the 
prevailing international system it would not be possible for the Security Council to 
implement the provisions o f Chapter VII. The enforcement action during the Korean 
case was possible only because the Soviet delegate was absent in the Security Council, 
and the Soviets would never allow the same thing happen again. The continuance o f 
the operation was maintained through the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which 
implicated that the General Assembly would assume more responsibility in matters of 
international peace and security than the Security Council from then on. How much 
power could the General Assembly exert through this resolution, however, needs a 
close look at the subsequent crises. The General Assembly proved to be unsuccessfiil 
against the Soviet action in Hungary in 1956, but was fairly successful during the Suez 
crisis in the same year. Thus, the Uniting for Peace Resolution would assure success 
only when there is great power cooperation, or one o f them is indifferent to the 
situation.
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Chapter 2: Peacekeeping in the Cold War Era 
1. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping:
1.1 The Birth of Peacekeeping, The Suez Crisis (1956):
Established after the Suez crisis o f 1956 the UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I) is the 
first force-level peacekeeping operation in the history o f the UN. In the previous years 
two other peacekeeping missions were established, but it was not until UNEF I that the 
term ‘peacekeeping’ was used.‘’
The crisis began when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956 
and evolved into an international crisis with Israel’s attack on Egypt on 29 October 
according to a preplanned design with Britain and France.™ Consequently, the United 
States submitted a drtift resolution to the Security Council on 30 October, “calling 
upon Israel to withdraw its armed forces to behind the 1949 armistice l i n e s . T h e  
draft resolution, however, was vetoed by France and Britain, the principal shareholders 
in the Suez Canal Company. Instead, Britain and France issued an ultimatum to both 
Israel and Egypt “calling on both parties to retreat to ten miles (16 kilometers) from 
the C a n a l . T h e  ultimatum was accepted by Israel, whose troops were in any event 
far from the canal, and rejected by Egypt, on the grounds that “its right to defend its 
territorial sovereignty should not be dictated by the British or the French.”™ Following 
Egypt’s rejection o f the ultimatum, Britain and France attacked Egypt on 31 October
14
which they “alleged, as a pretext for their invasion o f Eg3rpt, that they were intervening 
on behalf o f the international community to protect and isolate a waterway essential to 
international commerce from a local war.” '^*
The paralysis o f the Security Council because o f the British and French vetoes 
necessitated the transfer o f the matter to the General Assembly in accordance with the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution. Therefore, the General Assembly once again assumed 
responsibility in an international crisis, ‘1)ut this time for peacekeeping, not peace 
enforcement.” *^
Acting under the terms o f the Uniting for Peace Resolution the General Assembly 
adopted a draft resolution, proposed by the United States, calling on all parties to an 
immediate cease-fire. The resolution, however, was ignored by the parties to the 
conflict. The continuance o f fighting prompted forther action and on November 4 the 
General Assembly adopted two resolutions, proposed by the Canadian delegate to the
UN. Resolution 998 requested the Secretary-General to submit a p la n ..... to establish
a United Nations force to secure and supervise the cease-fire in accordance with 
previous resolutions adopted with respect to the crisis. Resolution 999 noted the 
noncompliance o f the parties to the cease-fire and requested the Secretary-General to 
obtain the withdrawal o f all forces behind the 1949 armistice lines. Finally, on 
November 5, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1000, which established 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). UNEF’s mandate comprised the following;
(l) to secure and supervise a cease-fire by forming a buffer zone between Anglo- 
French-lsraeli and E gplian force;
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(2) to supervise the wittidrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territoiy and the 
canal clearing operations;
(3) to patrol border areas and deter military incursions; and
(4) to secure the provisions of the Egypt-lsrael armistice agreements.^*
Because the UN had never established a force-level peacekeeping operation there was 
nothing before the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to serve as an example. 
Thus, his and his staff’s decisions regarding the Force’s command structure, logistics, 
compoation and funding were improvised. For the size, type and equipment o f 
troops Dag Hammarskjöld consulted Lieutenant General who, at that time was the 
Force Commander o f UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). UNTSO was 
established in 1948 the mandate o f which was to supervise truces between Israel and 
its Arab neighbors through observer groups deployed along the borders o f Israel and 
those o f its neighbors.^*
The Force would be deployed only on the territory o f Egypt since Israel did not give 
its consent to such a UN presence on its own territory. Accordingly, Dag 
Hammarskjöld and Nasser, the President o f Egypt, signed a memorandum stating that 
the presence o f UNEF was dependent on continued Egyptian consent.
The Force would be composed of voluntary contributions o f contingents from the 
members o f the UN. Since none o f the permanent members o f the Security Council 
were politically neutral to the crisis and since the crisis was to be isolated from great 
power rivalries Dag Hammarskjöld preferred to choose small and neutral countries to 
contribute to the Force. The Force would be lightly armed since it did not have a
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combatant character and was not a party to the conflict. Force would be used only as a 
last resort and for the purpose o f self-defense.
Dag Hammarskjöld recommended that the Force be funded through the regular UN 
budget. №s recommendation, however, caused much dd)ate in the UN General 
Assembly. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites argued that the cost o f 
the operation should be borne by the aggressors in the crisis, that is, Britain, France 
and Israel. Therefore the Soviet Union refused to pay its assessments for UNEF. This 
debate continued on the subsequent crises and bringing the UN on the verge o f 
bankruptcy.
On November 12, 1956, contingents began to arrive at UNEF’s temporary 
headquarters in Cairo.^^ UNEF operated until 1967 and successfully fiilfiUed mandate 
conveyed to it. In May 1967 UNEF had to withdraw upon the request o f the Egyptian 
government and the famous Sbc Day War erupted between Egypt and Israel shortly 
after UNEF began to withdraw.
UNEF 1 successfully fiilfiUed the mandate conveyed to it; by December 1956, all 
British and French forces were withdrawn fi-om the Egyptian territory, followed by 
complete withdrawal o f Israeli troops by March 1957, The Suez Canal was reopened 
in December 1956. UNEF I was also successful in forming a buffer zone between 
Egypt and Israel, thus preventing the recurrence o f fighting. Furthermore, while 
allowing Britain and France to withdraw without disgrace^*  ^ UNEF I also proved
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successful in preventing the conflict to become a battlefield o f great power 
confi-ontation. The success o f UNEF I increased the UN’s credibility in dealing with 
international crises in addition to establishing a precedent in dealing with subsequent 
conflicts.
1.2 The UN Operation in the Congo:
One o f the largest peacekeeping operations that the UN has undertaken is the United 
Operations in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC) with its 
20,000 troops at its peak strength in addition to a Civilian Component. Initially 
established to provide the newly foimded Congolese government for “technical 
assistance o f  a military nature”^' for the maintenance o f law and order in the country 
ONUC soon found itself in a much more complex and rapidly changing situation 
caused by external aggression, civil war and secession. Added to these was the 
difficulty o f operating in country, which is almost equivalent to the size o f Western 
Europe. Last, but not least, the Congo, because o f its rich resources, looked set to 
become the next superpower battleground.^^ Having been compelled to cope with all 
these factors at the same time it took four years (from 1960 to 1964) for UN to restore 
law and order in the Congo.
The operation itself, on the other hand, proved to be a very bitter and severe 
experience for the UN and “almost bankrupted the world organization and threatened
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its political life.”^^  Thus, the UN Operation in the Congo became an operation that “a 
generation o f UN officials wanted to forget, or, if not forget, then never to repeat.” “^*
1.2.1 The initial UN Involvement in the Congo:
The Congo’s quest for independence from the Belgian colonial rule began in 1959 
resulting in Belgium’s decision to grant independence to the country. Although the 
Belgian colonial administration provided the Congolese population with one o f the 
highest living standards on the continent^^ it had not been that generous in providing 
for political and educational advancement. Thus, at the time o f independence the 
Congo was a country with only 17 university graduates and with a population having 
little or no experience in political and administrative fields.
Following the elections that were held at the end o f May 1960 the Congolese 
Parliament convened and on June 29, the Congo became independent. On the same 
day the Belgian and Congolese governments signed a treaty o f friendship, assistance, 
and cooperation.
Under the treaty, most of the administrative and technical personnel would remain 
in the Congo on secondment to the Congolese government hence the Congolese 
population’s lack of experience in those fields. Furthermore, two Belgian mihtaiy 
bases would be maintained in the Congo and the Belgian troops would, at the 
request of the Congolese government, assist the goverament in maintaining law and 
order. Force Publique, the 25,000-man security force responsible for the 
maintenance of law and order in the Congo, would continue to be commanded by a 
Belgian Lieutenant-General together with 1,000 Belgian officers. The treaty, 
however, was never ratified.^'’
The crisis in the Congo began on 5 July, when the Congolese soldiers mutinied as a
result o f the rejection of their demands to get more promotion. As some mutineers
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attacked Belgians and other Europeans most Belgian administrators and technicians 
fled the country, adding to the breakdown in public services and to the government’s 
general inability to function.^’ Being faced with a rapid deterioration o f law and order 
in the country the Congolese government appealed to the UN for assistance o f a purely 
technical nature. The Congolese government requested military advisers, experts and 
technicians, to assist it in developing and strengthening the national army for the twin 
purposes o f national defense and the maintenance o f law and order.^* Subsequent 
developments, however, led to a change in the nature o f the government’s request for 
UN aid. On July 11, the Belgian troops, without the prior consent o f the Congolese 
government, moved into the Congo for the declared purpose o f protecting European 
life and property. Simultaneously, Moise Tshombe, the Provincial President, 
announced the independence o f Katanga, a mineral rich province on the south o f the 
Congo. As a result o f these events, the Congolese government requested UN military 
aid against external aggression, which constituted a threat to international peace.
Using his powers under article 99 o f the UN Charter"® the Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld brought the matter before the Security Council. On July 14, 1960 the 
Security Council adopted resolution 143 (1960) calling upon Belgium to withdraw its 
troops from the Congo and
decid[ed] to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary 
steps, in consultation with the government o f the Republic o f the 
Congo, to provide the government with such military assistance as may 
be necessary until, through the efforts o f the United Nations, the 
national security forces [would] be able, in the opinion o f the 
Government, to fully meet their tasks."'
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Therefore, the initial mandate o f ONUC was twofold: to help the Congolese 
Government restore law and order, and to bring about the withdrawal o f Belgian 
forces. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, in his report to the Security Council, lay 
out the principles regarding the organization and activities o f the UN Force in the 
Congo within the mandate conferred to the peacekeeping force. The principal 
guidelines were as follow:
(a) The Force was to be regarded as a temporary security force to be deployed in the 
Congo with the consent of the Congolese government.
(b) The Force was ... under the exclusive conunand of the United Nations, vested 
in the Secretary-General under the control of the Security CouncU. The Force 
was thus not under the orders of the Congolese Government and could not be 
permitted to become a party to any internal conflict.
(c) The authority granted to the United Nations Force could not be exercised within 
the Congo either in competition with the representatives of its Government or 
in cooperation with them io any joint operation. Thus, the United Nations 
Operation must be sqiorate and distinct from activities by any national 
authorities.
(d) The units of the Force most not become parties to internal conflict. They could 
not be enforced to enforce any specific political solution of pending problems or 
to influence the political balance decisive for such a solution.
(e) The United Nations military units were not authorized to use force except in 
self-defense.''^
First troops o f the UN peacekeeping force arrived in the Congo in mid-July. As ONUC 
forces deployed Belgian troops returned to their bases in the Congo and by the 
beginning o f August 1960 the complete withdrawal o f Belgian troops, except the 
province o f Katanga and the two bases, was realized.
The withdrawal o f Belgian troops from Katanga proved to be more problematic. On
the one hand Lumumba, the Prime Minister, wanted ONUC to put down secession in
Katanga by force, on the other hand the Katangese authorities strongly opposed the
entry o f the UN thus leaving Belgian troops with reluctance to withdraw. Under these
circumstances the Secretary-General referred the matter to the Security Council. The
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Security Council adopted resolution 146 (1960) o f 9 August 1960 coniimiing "the 
authority given to the Secretary-General by [previous] Security Council resolutions ... 
and request[ed] him to continue to carry out the responsibility placed on him 
thereby. The Security Council further declared that the entry o f United Nations 
Forces into Katanga was necessary. With regards to Lumumba's demand that ONUC 
end Kattmgese secession by force, the Security Council reiterated the Secretary- 
General's position that "the United Nations Force in the Congo [would] not be a party 
to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome o f any internal 
conflict."'*^ Frustrated by the fact that ONUC would not help the Congolese 
Government to put down secession Katanga, Lumumba, from then on refused to 
cooperate with the UN making the work o f ONUC even more difficult.
After the adoption o f the resolution Secretary-General himself led the first troops to 
Katanga on 12 August. By September, the Belgian Forces were withdrawn from both 
Katanga and the two military bases. Therefore within 3 months ONUC was able to 
clear the whole Congo fi^om the Belgian troops. The secession o f Katanga, however, 
remained unresolved.
1.2.2 The Constitutional Crisis (September 1960 - September 1961):
The events that led to the constitutional crisis and eventually to civil war in the Congo 
began in August when another tribe, Kasai, proclaimed its secession. Prime Minister 
Lumumba attempted to put down the secession through Soviet logistic support and
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killed nearly 1,000 people o f the Kasai province. Kasavubu, the President o f the 
Republic o f the Congo, opposed Lumumba's action and on 5 September he announced 
that he dismissed Lumumba from his office. In turn Lumumba dismissed Kasavubu- a 
legally untenable but potentially enforceable proposition because o f Lumumba's 
Russian logistic support.'*^ Furthermore in mid-September Colonel Mobutu staged a 
coup in support o f President Kasavubu. However, Mobutu had a weak control over 
the army therefore Lumumba was able to resist him. During this turmoil what ONUC 
did was to set up protected areas for the safety o f both the Africans and the 
Europeans. In addition to that ONUC guards were stationed around the residences of 
both Kasavubu and Lumumba while protection was given to the leaders o f other 
political factions as well. From then on there was no internationally recognized 
government in the Congo although Kasavubu gained de facto recognition o f his 
Government through winning the right to represent the Congo in the General 
Assembly.
Although the contending parties turned to ONUC for recognition and support"*  ^ the 
Secretary-General issued a policy o f equidistance from all political factions to maintain 
its impartiality.'*^ However the principle o f impartiality, which proved to have 
invaluable contributions to the maintenance o f peace in an inter-state conflict, proved 
not to work out and give the desired results in an intra-state conflict. The contending 
factions either viewed ONUC with suspicion or an ally o f the opposing side, which in 
turn made ONUC vulnerable to attacks from almost all political factions.
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On the other hand, at the United Nations in New York Secretary-General Dag 
Hanunarskjold was exposed to immense criticism because of his policy o f impartiality. 
The Soviet Union, supporting decolonization as a token to influence the Third World, 
severely criticized Dag Hammarskjöld for not putting down secession in Katanga. 
After Lumumba's ouster the Soviet Union demanded the Secretary-General's 
resignation and deadlocked the Security Covmcil. The matter then had to be transferred 
to the General Assembly, through a procedural vote in the Security Coimcil'**, under 
the Uniting for Peace resolution. The General Assembly adopted resolution 1474 o f 20 
September I960 expressing its full support o f the previous Security Council 
resolutions and Dag Hammarskjold's policies. This was a clear signal to Moscow that, 
whatever suspicions there might be and however bitterly loyalties might be strained, 
the Africans and Asians were still determined to back the UN operation and not allow 
Cold War rivalries to open up irreparable sp l i t s .Af te r  the adoption o f this resolution 
the Soviet Union went a step further and demanded the resignation o f the Secretary- 
General and his replacement by a troika (firom pro-Western bloc, the non-aligned bloc, 
and the pro-Soviet bloc).^** But this proposition failed to gain effective support in the 
General Assembly.
However, the Soviet Union was not the only country that attacked Hammaskjold. The 
Western countries were also criticizing the Secretary-Generals policy o f impartiality 
because "it implicitly kept [pro-Soviet] Lumumba in the game when those [Western] 
countries wanted him out."^' Therefore, while trapped in a critical situation in the 
Congo ONUC could not gain the support o f the members o f the Security Council
24
which is one o f the fundamental prerequisites for the success o f a peacekeeping 
operation.
The situation got worse with Lumumba's death. Towards the end o f November 1960 
Lumumba escaped from his residence in an attempt to reach upcountry where his 
political stronghold was. However he was captured by the ANC (Army Nacionel 
Congolese, the National Army of the Congo) soldiers loyal to Mobutu. He was then 
transferred to the province o f tCatanga and was killed on 17 Januaiy 1960. Lumumba's 
death was followed by a series o f fights between the pro-Lumumba and anti-Lumumba 
factions. The situation worsened when the troop contributing countries o f ONUC that 
are sympathetic towards Lumumba (Guinea, Indonesia, Mali, Morocco, the United 
Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia) "withdrew their contingents from the United Nations 
Force in protest after Lumumba's detention and death, temporarily reducing UN force 
levels by one third in a critical period. Moreover, the Soviet Union announced that it 
would not recognize Dag Hammarskjöld as the Secretary-General.
Therefore the Security Council met once again and adopted resolution 161 (1961) o f 
21 February 1961, by which it authorized ONUC to use force, as a last resort, to 
prevent civil war in the Congo. The Security Council further stated that "measures be 
taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo o f all Belgian and 
other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisors not under the 
United Nations Command, and mercenaries"” , which had direct connection with 
Katanga's secession.
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Throughout the constitutional crisis and the civil war ONUC had a hard time in 
fillfilling its mandate. Especially after the Security Council adopted resolution 161 
(1961) the local factions "interpreted the Council's new resolution as an attempt to 
subdue them by force, and in retaliation, ordered a number o f harassing measures 
against ONUC and its personnel.*'* Therefore, while endeavoring to bring peace to the 
country ONUC itself became a target for the local factions.
While ONUC was endeavoring to stop hostilities on the ground it spared no eSbrt to 
persuade the political leaders to national reconciliation. Conciliation efforts were also 
made by the United Nations Conciliation Committee, established by the General 
Assembly resolution o f 20 September 1960 which was composed o f members o f the 
troop contributing countries. At last the Parliament was able to reconvene on 2 August 
1961 thanks to the good offices and mediation efforts and the protection provided to 
the members o f the Parliament by ONUC.
1.2.3 Ending Secession in Katanga (September 1%1 - February 1%3):
During the constitutional crisis ONUC avoided from interfering in the domestic affairs 
o f the Congo thus not taking effective measures against the secession o f Katanga in 
order to preserve its impartiality. Although the Security Council had taken steps in that 
direction by adopting resolution 161 (1961) it was not until the formation o f an 
internationally recognized government in the Congo that the Security Council could 
deal actively with this matter. Therefore, after the formation o f the Government o f
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National Unity ONUC turned its efforts at helping the Government remove the foreign 
elements that had provided the teeth o f the attempt to sever, in their own interests, the 
Congo's richest province from the rest o f the country .
Although the Belgian troops withdrew from Katanga in August 1960 the secession of 
Katanga could not be terminated because Tshombe continued to receive foreign 
assistance from Belgian officers and mercenaries o f other nationalities. In addition to 
that, he also imported large quantities o f arms, and war materiel, including aircraft, 
from abroad.^ Therefore, with the elimination o f foreign assistance to Katanga the 
secession would be ended.
While attempting to remove foreign assistance to Katanga ONUC faced with immense 
difficulty with Tshombe’s deceptive attitude and armed attacks against the UN 
soldiers. Therefore, the Security Council once again revised the mandate o f ONUC and 
on 24 November 1961 adopted Resolution 169, the strongest and most direct 
authorization o f force. While the Security Council rejected the claim that Katanga is "a 
sovereign independent nation" and recognized the Government o f the Republic o f the 
Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct o f the external affairs o f the Congo,^’ 
it also
[authorized] the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of the 
requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention 
pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary 
personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and
• sxmerccnanes.
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Although these were attempts directed at ending secession in Katanga the UN "never 
added it to the formal objectives o f the Force. Even its most forceful actions against 
Tshombe's regime were taken, officially, to preserve its own freedom o f movement."^’ 
While ONUC was endeavoring to remove foreign assistance in the field, the efforts o f 
a plan for reconciliation continued on the diplomatic field. It took, however, two years 
for ONUC to remove all foreign assistance on which Tshombe relied. Once the foreign 
elements were removed Tshombe agreed to end the secession o f Katanga.
On 21 January 196.3, the United Nations announced the end of niilitaiy operations 
and of Katangan secession and declared that all important centers in Katanga were 
under UN control. In a release issued the same day in New York, U Thant stated 
that the military portion of ONUC had been completed and that UN troops would 
gradually be withdrawn.^
Therefore, ONUC began to withdraw from the Congo, gradually reducing its size to 
3,000 officers, which continued to offer technical assistance to the Congolese security 
forces upon the request o f the Prime Minister o f the Congo and the recommendation 
o f the UN Security Council. On June 1964 ONUC completely withdrew from the 
country. However, technical assistance, which had been supplied by the United Nations 
family o f organizations continued under the responsibility o f the Office o f the Resident 
Representative o f the United Nations Development Programme.*^^
1.2.4 The CivUian Component of ONUC:
The United Nations Operation in the Congo also included a civilian component for the 
purpose o f restoring essential public services since the breakdown o f these services 
was one o f the fundamental causes o f the conflict in the Congo. For this purpose a
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consultative group o f experts was set up, consisting o f senior officials o f the United 
Nations and the specialized agencies concerned. The training programs were carried 
out in the fields o f economy, law and administration, agriculture and health. As a result 
o f these training programs it became possible, in 1963, to replace some international 
personnel by qualified Congolese citizens.
1.2.5 Assessment of the UN Operation in the Congo:
Just as UNEF I demonstrates how peacekeeping can be successful when certain 
conditions are met, ONUC demonstrates the limits o f peacekeeping and how it can 
produce disastrous results when it moves beyond those limits. As William J. Durch 
points out,
[t|he UN Operation in the Congo lacked every element that history now says is 
necessary for a successful peacekeeping mission; namely, effective support from the 
Great Powers, consistent support of all local parties, a clear mandate, and stable and 
adequate fimding.“
ONUC received political support neither from the mandating authority, that is, the 
Security Council nor fi’om the local parties. The initial consensus in the Security 
Council that enabled ONUC to be established started to diminish once the Soviet 
Union realized that ONUC would not put down secession in Katanga through force. 
The murder o f the pro-Soviet Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba further frustrated 
the Soviet Union leading to a deadlock in the Security Council and to the Soviet 
Union's declaration that it would no longer recognize Dag Hammarskjöld as the 
Secretary-General.
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ONUC did not recdve the support o f the local parties as well. Lumumba withdrew his 
support from ONUC when ONUC refused to end secession Katanga by using force. 
President Kasavubu, on the other hand, withdrew his support when he ousted 
Lumumba and ONUC continued to offer Lumumba protection in an attempt not to 
take sides with any political faction. Furthermore, ONUC refused to recognize 
Kasavubu even when his government won the right the represent the Congo in the UN 
General Assembly. Therefore, ONUC could not get the support o f the state in whose 
territory it operated. In addition to that ONUC tried to preserve its neutrality during 
the constitutional crisis, which also proved to be detrimental rather than helpful. Each 
political faction in the Congo perceived ONUC as an ally o f its opponent. Thus, 
ONUC became a target, indeed a vulnerable target for the political factions; hence the 
Force was not armed for combat, but rather for self-defense.
The mandate conferred to ONUC, on the other hand, was rather a vague one. 
However, "in a case involving so many competing political interests-local, regional, 
and Great Power- it would have been unrealistic to expect a mandate for the 
peacekeeping force that laid out precise objectives. Although the Security Council 
”call[ed] upon the Government o f Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory o f 
the Republic o f the Congo"^* it avoided to use the term 'aggression' against Belgium's 
intervention because such a wording in the resolution would necessitate the use o f 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII o f the UN Charter. The Security Council, 
however, did not have the political will to deal with the crisis through enforcement 
given the strict circumstances o f the Cold War context.
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On the other hand, as the situation exacerbated by the constitutional crisis and civil war 
in the Congo the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement began to 
blur. After Lumumba's death the Security Council adopted resolution 161 (1961) 
enabling ONUC to use force, although in the last resort, to prevent occurrence o f civil 
war in the Congo.
This resolution had no parallel in UN history. The Council had authorized a 'non­
threatening' peacekeeping force, neither mandated nor equipped to fight a 
campaign, to adopt an enforcement role without first determining that a threat to 
international peace and security existed, i.e. without a formal move to Chapter VII 
of the Charter, still less the adoption as a first expedient of non-military coercive 
measures such as economic sanctions.^
Therefore, ONUC began to move from peacekeeping to peace enforcement making it 
”a part o f the conflict it was supposed to be controlling, and therefore a part o f the 
problem."^’
The financial aspect o f the operation was no good either. In December I960, the Fifth 
Committee o f the General Assembly, which is the budgetary and administrative body, 
proposed that the expenses o f ONUC be considered "expenses o f the Organization" 
and thus subject to mandatory assessments^* under Article 17(2)^^ o f the UN Charter. 
However, the Soviet Union refused to pay its assessments for ONUC and argued that 
"the whole operation in the Congo was Western-inspired and ’biased', and thus should 
be supported by voluntary contributions from those countries with a direct interest in 
it"™ as it did in UNEF 1 when it argued that the expenses o f UNEF 1 should be borne 
by the aggressors. Furthermore, while France also refiised to pay for ONUC, some 
states with-held their funds in protest o f UN policy in the Congo, and some others 
reduced their share to a minimum. Therefore, the UN found itself in a financial crisis.
31
The UN had to issue $200 million in UN bonds to cover expenses for ONUC and 
U N EF1. The bonds would be repaid over 25 years through regular UN assessments/*
In 1962 the General Assembly requested the advisory opinion o f the International 
Court o f Justice on
Whether certain expenditures which were authorized by the General Assembly to 
cover the costs of the United Nations operations in the Congo and of the operations 
of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East "constitute 'expenses of 
the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of 
the United Nations.^^
The Court decided that the expenditures authorized by the General Assembly 
resolutions are legitimate expenses o f the Organization which Member States could be 
obligated to pay. Despite the opinion o f the International Court o f Justice the Soviet 
continued not to pay for ONUC. Therefore, throughout 1962 and 1963 ONUC had to 
be funded through the issuance o f bonds.
The UN Operation in the Congo was the most expansive operation that the UN has 
embarked upon during the Cold War. The tasks o f peacekeepers ranged from 
providing technical assistance to the Congolese Government to prevention o f civil war, 
ending secession and training o f the Congolese personnel. In the end the UN was 
successful in keeping the Congo in tact but at a high cost. The Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld lost his life (1961) in a plane crash while he was traveling to Katanga to 
meet Tshombe. The UN personnel was attacked in some cases and suffered casualties. 
The funding was a problem, the use o f force was another problem. Thus, from 
beginning to its end ONUC remained the most controversial operation in the history o f 
the UN. From then on the UN became more hesitant to get involved in conflicts which
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had internal dimensions and it never approved another peacekeeping operation without 
adequate funding or without establishing time limits. Hence it was not until the end of 
the Cold War era that the UN undertook such a comprehensive operation and without 
the existence o f a cease-fire at least.
2. UN Peacekeeping in the Cold War Era, An Overall Analysis:
2.1 Characteristics of Peacekeeping Operations:
During the Cold War the tasks assigned to peacekeepers were limited hence the 
operations served a limited purpose, that is, keeping the peace, not imposing any 
solution to the parties in conflict. It is possible to divide peacekeeping operations into 
two broad categories: observer missions and peacekeeping forces. The observer 
missions are composed o f usually unarmed military observers the tasks o f which 
include observing cease-fires, detecting and reporting on the violations o f the cease­
fires and supervising troop withdrawals. As neutral observers, peacekeepers can ensure 
that none o f the protagonists perform actions that violate the agreement that 
established the peacekeeping operation and the cessation o f military hostilities.’  ^ The 
peacekeeping forces, on the other hand, are composed o f national contingents. The 
primary responsibility o f a peacekeeping force is to separate the warring parties 
through interposing themselves between them. Through such a buffer zone the 
conflicting parties are prevented fi^om direct contact which lessens the possibility of 
hostile incidents that could escalate into a full-scale war. Although the peacekeepers
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are lightly armed and cannot prevent a conflicting party from crossing the buffer zone 
it is not the arms but the moral weight that the peacekeeping force exerts. Hence, a 
state may be reluctant to use military force if it knows that military offensives must go 
through UN forces, risking loss o f life and international condemnation.’'’ In addition to 
that, the function o f a peacekeeping force may encompass that o f an observer mission. 
The most striking feature o f peacekeeping operations is that they are noncoercive 
actions although they are essentially military in nature. Thus, peacekeeping is a non­
threatening activity. This is crucial for the simple reason that if the operation, for some 
reason or other, abandons its non-threatening posture then it will inevitably become 
party to the dispute and hence lose its claim to be a peacekeeping body.’* Therefore, 
the peacekeeping operation singles no one out as the aggressor and blames no one for 
the conflict nor it attempts to impose its will on the warring parties.
Another feature o f peacekeeping is that -as the term 'peacekeeping* itself suggests- a 
peacekeeping force usually deploys in areas where there is a peace to be kept. In other 
words, a peacekeeping force is not designed to restore order or stop the fighting 
between rival enemies. Therefore, if the warring parties have a desire to let the UN 
handle the conflict then they must at least agree to a cease-fire. Although in some cases 
the UN faced situations where there was no peace to keep it resorted to minimal use o f 
force and tried to persuade the warring parties to a cease-fire through the efforts o f 
mediation and negotiation.
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As mentioned earlier peacekeeping operations were established in an hoc manner. 
The term ’peacekeeping’ is not defined in the UN Charter. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that there are no established rules or guidelines for peacekeeping that 
distinguishes it fi-om collective security or any other form o f military action. In fact the 
UN had to find its own way through gaining experience and learning lessons from each 
and every peacekeeping operation that it had conducted. Thus, over time there 
developed several principles on which the success o f a peacekeeping operation 
depended. These principles served as guidelines for the UN in the establishment o f 
subsequent peacekeeping operations. The lack o f any o f these principles often 
produced undesirable results for the UN and cast a shadow to the success o f the 
operations. Among these principles, the consent o f the parties to the conflict, the 
impartiality o f the UN peacekeeping force, and non-use o f force stand out as the most 
important ones which have been determining factors o f the success o f a peacekeeping 
operation. These principles still have relevance in the post-Cold War era.
2.2.1 The Consent of the Parties to the Conflict: The first and most important 
prerequisite to the success o f a peacekeeping operation is the consent o f the host state. 
For example, during the Suez crisis o f 1956 UN peacekeeping forces were only 
deployed on the territory o f Egypt since Israel did not give permission to UN presence 
on its own territory. Any attempt to deploy peacekeepers without the approval o f the 
host state, on the other hand, would defeat the very purpose o f limiting hostilities in
2.2 Elements of Success in a Peacekeeping Mbsion:
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the area since such an action would precipitate attacks on peacekeepers by the host 
country. Therefore the consent o f the host state "greatly reduces the likelihood that 
peacekeepers will encounter resistance while carrying out their duties."’  ^ The consent 
o f the host state also shows that there is at least nomiruil commitment to peace. It 
should be noted, however, that the consent o f the host state to the presence o f a UN 
peacekeeping force in its territory "does not constitute an indefinite legal right for the 
operation; it may be withdrawn any time."’’ For instance, in 1%7, just before 
laimching an attack against Israel the Egyptian President Nasser demanded the 
withdrawal o f UNEF I. Under such circumstances there is little option for the UN but 
to withdraw.’*
2.2.2 The Impartiality of the UN Peacekeeping Force: The impartiality o f the 
peacekeeping force suggests that the UN peacekeepers have no initial bias toward 
either side and thus cannot be party to any conflict either domestic or international nor 
they would resort to actions, which favor one side or the other. Therefore, to achieve 
impartiality, the UN has refrained from including contingents from the Permanent 
Members o f the Security Council in the peacekeeping forces hence such an act would 
be against the very purpose o f the mission, that is isolating local conflicts from the 
Cold War context. In addition to that the UN was carefiil in not including contingent 
from countries which have a direct interest in the conflict at hand. Thus, the UN 
peacekeeping forces would normally be composed o f small and nonaligned states 
although there are exceptional cases where one or more Permanent Members o f the 
Security Council stand out as troop contributors. For instance, France provided troops
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for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and Britain provided troops for the UN Force in 
Cyprus.
2.2.3 The Principle of Non-use of Force: Peacekeepers carry light weapons and use 
them only as a last resort and in self-defense since they rely on diplomatic means for 
the solution o f the dispute rather than on arms. Therefore, with limited military 
capability the peacekeepers are not threatening to belligerents. However, during the 
UN Operation in the Congo the peacekeepers were given tasks which required the use 
o f force such as assisting the Congolese Government in restoring law and order, and 
expelling foreign elements from the province o f Katanga. Therefore, the subsequent 
UN peacekeeping operations adopted a wider definition o f the use o f force for self- 
defense. "Self-defense would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to 
prevent [the peacekeeping force] from discharging its duties under the mandate o f the 
Security Council."™ In practice, however, most commanders refrained from utilizing 
this wider definition o f self-defense with the concerns that the peacekeeping force 
might lose its impartial character and that hence the peacekeepers are lightly armed 
they might be vulnerable targets for attacks from the local parties.
Other than the three basic principles o f peacekeeping cited above there are other 
factors which are also necessary if success is to be ensured. First, peacekeeping 
operations must have full support from the Security Council. This is necessary not only 
in the initial stage o f establishment o f the peacekeeping operation but also in later 
stages when decisions are to be made regarding budgets, troop allotments and when
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mandates come up for renewal. The problems that ONUC faced illustrates how 
difficulties arise when support fi'om the Security Council is lacking. The peacekeeping 
force must have the support and cooperation o f the local parties as well. Again, in the 
Congo it proved very difficult for ONUC to fulfill its mandate when the local parties 
turned hostile and withdrew their cooperation. Secondly, the peacekeeping operation 
must have a clear and practicable mandate. The goals of the mission should clearly 
defined and known to all parties involved. Such clarity o f the mission helps to reduce 
local suspicion towards the peacekeeping force. Yet a certain degree o f flexibility is 
desirable so that the peacekeepers may adapt their operation strategies to better fit 
changing circumstances.*** Lastly, the Member States should be willing to provide 
adequate financing for the mission. Because peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN 
Charter the process through which a peacekeeping operation should be financed 
remains absent as well. The problem o f financing peacekeeping operations began with 
the establishment o f UNEF I and reached its peak during the UN Operation in the 
Congo where the Organization was almost going bankrupt. Furthermore, ONUC 
deployed without the approval o f its budget by the General Assembly. Later on, no 
peacekeeping operation was deployed without getting its budget approved in the 
General Assembly, which slowed down the process o f deployment but at least ensured 
sustained funding.
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As mentioned earlier the founders o f the UN envisaged a collective security system to 
deal with international conflicts. However, the post-World War order did not permit 
the utilization o f this system. Both the United States and the Soviet Union would block 
any initiative that they conceived to be against their interests through exercising then- 
veto powers in the Security Council. Thus, the ideological rivalry o f the two super 
powers caused much friction and prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its 
primaiy responsibility, that is, maintenance o f international peace and security. 
Therefore, peacekeeping emerged as a response to the stalemate between the 
Pernuuient Members o f the Security Council and it became a substitute for collective 
security. Peacekeeping was thus a by-product ... o f the Cold War; an improvisation in 
the effort o f the UN to transcend or b)q)ass the constraints o f the Cold War in search 
o f a role in a specific crisis.*^
During the Cold War the major contribution o f peacekeeping with regards to the 
maintenance o f international peace and security was to contain regional or local 
conflicts so as to prevent them from escalating into major wars where a direct clash o f 
the two superpowers would be inevitable given the circumstances o f the Cold War 
system. In this sense peacekeeping was highly successful in that it was able to prevent 
another World War from breaking out.
Yet, UN peacekeeping was not that successful in addressing the root causes o f 
conflicts and laying out plans for long-term political solutions. The peacekeeping
2.3 UN Peacekeeping in the Cold War: Success or Failure?
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missions that have been going on for decades are a good illustration o f the weakness o f 
UN peacekeeping in this area. For instance, the United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization (UNTSO) was established in 1948 to supervise Israel-Arab truces. After 
fifty years o f its establishment this mission is still in place. Another one, which is still 
active today, is the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGBP) 
established in 1949 to monitor India-Pakistan truce in Kashmir. UN Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus, established in 1964, is still providing a buffer zone between the 
Turkish and Greek communities o f the island o f Cyprus. The two peacekeeping 
missions established in the Middle East in the 1970s, namely the UN Disengagement 
Observer Force (UNDOF) -established in 1974- and UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) -established in 1978- are also continuing to function today. Therefore, 
peacekeeping, which started as a mechanism for buying time in order to settle the 
underlying dispute "ended up as a substitute for it, a soft option or alternative for 
political inaction."*^ The reason for this political inaction is best explained by Brian 
Urquhart. He states that,
...the Security Council, because of its dissensions, had failed to create a benevolent 
international framework to assist combatants to resolve their differences and to 
provide the necessary protective apparatus. ... Without such an international 
framework it is often impossible for the parties to a situation that is violent, deep- 
rooted and complex to make progress on their own and in the open."^
Thus, the Great Powers were only interested in freezing the conflict so that they would 
avoid direct confrontation with each other. They were interested in a standstill rather 
than in really solving the problem "not to mention that solving the underlying problem 
would have reduced the dependence o f the local parties on the superpowers. It was 
not until the end o f the 1980s, with the emergence o f the cooperative mood in the
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Security Council, that the UN was able to direct its eflForts towards achieving long­
term political solutions to the disputes.
Another weakness o f UN peacekeeping operations stemmed from the fact that the 
operations remained distinctly ad hoc. That is, the UN did not acquire any military 
units at its disposal that it would send immediately to areas when the conflicts arose. 
Propositions were made for the creation standby forces or a permanent UN force but 
they did not receive much support. Only a few states, namely the Scandinavian 
countries and Canada, trained their soldiers specifically for peacekeeping.
During the Cold War, 13 peacekeeping operations were established with 7 o f them 
being in the Middle East. The last peacekeeping operation established in the Cold War 
was UNIFIL in 1978. Then, until 1988 no new peacekeeping operation was established 
by the UN .
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Chapter 3: Moving Towards Next Generation: The Changing Nature of UN 
Peacekeeping (1988-1991)
Although the change in the nature o f peacekeeping gained momentum with an
expansion o f its activities after the Gulf War o f 1991 it is possible to trace this change
back to 1988 when new peacekeeping operations began to be established after a period
o f ten years. What enabled the re-entrance o f peacekeeping in international politics was
the change in the attitudes o f both the Soviet Union and the United States towards the
UN leading to an unprecedented consensus in the Security Council. The first signs of
change came fi'om the Soviet Union during in 1987. The Soviet Leader Mikhail
Gorbachev, in an article published in Pravda stated that “the world was becoming
increasingly interrelated and interdependent: there was therefore a need for a
mechanism which was capable o f discussing common problems. The Permanent
Members could become guarantors o f regional security. More use should be made of
UN peacekeeping bodies, and o f the UN Secretary-General’s potential peace-making
role.”*^  Furthermore, he announced that the Soviet Union would pay its debts to the
UN, which amounted to $200 million including its assessments for peacekeeping
operations. This was indeed a dramatic shift o f Soviet foreign policy since the Soviet
Union opposed paying its assessments for peacekeeping operations because it found
the peacekeeping operations unconstitutional.
The shift in the Soviet policy resulted from that country's need to withdraw support 
from numerous conflicts and concentrate on economic reform. A decade of military 
buildup and wars by proxy had drained its treasury, and the USSR had to retract its 
over-stretched foreign policy."*
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The Soviet Union's initiatives to put the UN back in the agenda also helped the 
American behavior against the UN to moderate. In 1988 the American President 
Ronald Reagan "praised the work o f the [UN], the Secretaiy-General, and UN 
peacekeepers, and ... vowed to repay US debts to the Organization."*’
Thus, the Security Council was now again able to take part actively in matters 
r^ard ing  international peace and security. This time, however, the UN engaged not 
only in peacekeeping but also in peacemaking in long-standing regional conflicts. 
Beyond its traditional tasks o f supervising withdrawal o f troops, observing cease-fires 
and forming buffer zones between the belligerents peacekeeping also began to acquire 
new tasks such as observing elections, physical disarming of local factions or verifying 
human rights. Thus, the inclusion o f a civilian component in these operations reflected 
the changing nature o f peacekeeping. Therefore, the most striking feature o f these new 
peacekeeping operations was that with the acquisition o f new tasks, the UN was not 
only trying to freeze the conflict but it was also striving to find long-term political 
solutions thus also acting as a peacemaker.
1. New Operations and New Tasks for Peacekeepers
1.1 Afghanistan:
Although a traditional observer mission UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (UNGOMAP) was the first peacekeeping operation in an area where one of
43
the superpowers was directly involved. In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan 
with the declared aim o f helping the Afghan Government to maintain law and order in 
the country. However, Afghanistan turned out to be the Soviet Union’s Vietnam from 
which it sought to extricate itself in a face-saving way. The efforts o f UN mediator 
Diego Cordovez during the 1980s bore its fruits and UNGOMAP was established in 
1988 to monitor and verify the withdrawal o f more than 100,000 Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan. For this purpose the UN sent 50 military observers to Afghanistan. The 
withdrawal o f Soviet troops was completed in February 1990 and UNGOMAP's 
mandate was terminated in March 1990. Thus, for the first time in its history the UN 
conducted an operation in which one o f the Great Powers was directly involved.
1.2 Iran-Iraq:
The second peacekeeping operation established during the period between 1998 and 
1991 was the UN Iran-Iraq Observer Mission (UNIIMOG). After eight years o f war 
Iran and Iraq had finally come to an agreement to bring an end to the long lasting war 
and the Security Council was able to secure a cease-fire in 1988. Thus a group o f 350 
unarmed military observers from 25 countries were dispatched to the border between 
Iran and Iraq with the traditional aim o f observation. The mandate o f UNIIMOG
included
(the| establishment of ccase-fiie lines; nmnitoring compliance with the ccasc-lirc; 
investigation of violations; prevention, through negotiation of any other change in 
the status quo pending withdrawal of their respective forces to internationally 
recognized boundaries; to supervise, verify and confirm the withdrawal of all forces 
to these internationally recognized boundaries; and to obtain the agreement of the 
parties to other arrangements which, pending negotiation of a comprehensive 
settlement, could help reduce tension and build confidence between them.*^ "
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Although some difficulties arose regarding the violations o f cease-fire (in its firs five 
months UNUMOG investigated almost 2,000 complaints of truce violations) 
UNIIMOG was able to prevent the renewal o f war between Iran and Iraq.
1.3 Angola:
The third UN mission had a similar mandate with UNGOMAP. The UN established the 
first Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) the mandate o f which was to monitor 
the withdrawal o f Cuban troops from Angola. UNAVEM I was established as a part o f 
a regional peace settlement that would bring independence to Namibia, a former 
German colony administered by South Africa.
With support from the Soviet Union and Cuba Popular Movement for the Liberation 
o f Angola (MPLA) finally succeeded in winning the civil war which had begun in 
1975, after the transitional government leading Angola out o f Portuguese dependence 
collapsed in August o f that same year.’*^ On the other hand the two resistance 
movements in the country, namely National Union for the Total Independence o f 
Angola (UNITA) received support from the United States and South Africa. Thus, 
Angola was already in chaos with the two superpowers providing support for different 
political factions in the country. The situation worsened when South Africa conducted 
raids into the territory o f Angola with the declared aim o f capturing the South West 
Alfican Peoples Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas -fighting against South Africa to 
bring independence to Namibia- escaping from Namibia. In turn the MPLA
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government in Angola requested troops from Cuba. By 1988 the number o f Cuban 
troops in Angola had reached to 50,000. Although the Security Council had taken 
steps to the resolution o f this crisis, and even adopted resolutions "condemning] 
South Africa’s aggression against ... Angola and demand[ing] South Africa to respect 
the independence, sovereignty and territorial in t^rity  o f ... Angola"^ it was neither 
able to prevent South Africa from conducting raids against Angola nor it was able to 
secure the withdrawal o f Cuban troops from that country until 1988 with the 
cooperative mood revealing in the Security Council.
In December 1988 the Security Council was able to establish UNAVEM I with the 
signing o f peace agreements between South Africa, Angola and Cuba. The mandate o f 
UNAVEM I was to "verify the redeployment northwards and the phased total 
withdrawal o f Cuban troops from the territory o f Angola in accordance with the 
timetable agreed between Angola and Cuba."^‘ For this purpose 70 military observers 
supported by 22 international and locally recruited staff was dispatched to Angola. 
Two days later from the adoption of this resolution Angola and Cuba signed a bilateral 
agreement, which set the timetable for the phased withdrawal o f Cuban troops from 
Angola. According to the timetable the withdrawal o f Cuban troops would be 
completed within 27 months. During this period both Angola and Cuba complied with 
their commitments, and therefore the withdrawal o f Cuban troops was completed two 
months before the actual time set. One reason for this was that the presence o f Cuban 
troops in its territory cost to Angola $20 million a year, which it could no longer 
afford.^ Consequently, on 6 June 1991 the Secretary-General reported to "the
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[Security] Council that UNAVEM I had carried out, fully and effectively, the mandate 
entrusted to it."^^
Thus, the UN was now able to resolve conflicts, which remained unaddressed by the 
Organization for a long time because o f the Security Council's inability to reach a 
consensus on these issues. Although these first three missions were observer missions 
the success o f these missions reflected the cooperation o f the Great Powers in the 
Security Council and signaled the beginning o f a new era in which the UN could now 
assume more responsibility in matters regarding international peace and security.
1.4 Namibia
The establishment o f United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in 
Namibia pointed out to the emergence o f the multidimensional character o f UN 
peacekeeping.
Although the efforts o f the Security Council to bring independence to South West 
Africa (Namibia) fi’om South African colonial rule date back to 1970s, it was not until 
1989 that the Council could take concrete steps in that direction. In fact, UNTAG was 
established in 1978 (through Security Council resolution 435 (1978) o f 29 September 
1978) but it did not become operational for ten years because South Africa rejected 
UN presence in Namibia. South Africa linked the Namibian settlement with the 
presence o f Cuban troops in Angola because it perceived this presence as a direct
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threat to its security. After the Reagan administration took office. South Africa gained 
support from the United States in that view. With international circumstances 
becoming more favorable for the de-colonization o f Namibia at the end o f the 1980s 
the UN could take the establishment o f UNTAG back to its agenda. Thus, through 
adopting resolution 629 (1989) o f 16 January 1989 the Security Council decided that 
resolution 435 (1978) would be implemented starting from 1 April 1989. Originally -in 
1978- UNTAG was to be an operation the nature o f which would be military. 
However, after ten years o f its initial establishment the mission "had become a non- 
traditional peacekeeping effort, with much more of a civilian, political role. This 
change was reflected in a downsizing o f the military component and an increase in the 
number o f civilian police monitors.
UNTAG had three objectives which would be carried out by various components. The 
civilian electoral personnel o f UNTAG was responsible for supervising and controlling 
elections to ensure that they are free and fair. Although the elections were to be 
organized and conducted by the South Afiican Administrator General the elections 
were to be under the supervision and control o f the Special Representative o f the 
Secretary-General. This meant that " the Special Representative o f the Secretary- 
General had at each stage, level and stage and place to satisfy himself that the conduct 
and the procedure o f the election, including the establishment o f the list o f candidates, 
the taking o f the poll, the determination o f the results of the poll and the declaration o f 
the results o f the election are fair and appropriate.
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The monitoring o f the South West African Police (SWAPOL) was the responsibility o f 
the UN police monitors (CIVPOL) whereas the military component o f UNTAG was 
charged with the responsibility o f monitoring the cease-fire. This responsibility also 
included the withdrawal o f SWAPO guerrillas to recognized bases in Angola and 
Zambia and to ensure that they are disarmed before they are repatriated. The military 
component was also responsible for monitoring the conduct o f South African military 
personnel who continued to perform civilian duties. UNTAG also registered voters and 
facilitated information about the election process.
The UN operation in Namibia went smoothly because the parties were committed to 
peace hence they cooperated with the UN. The UN followed traditional rules o f 
peacekeeping (consent, minimal use o f force, and impartiality) which also contributed 
to the success o f the operation. The elections for the Constituent Assembly were held 
between 7-11 November 1989 and SWAPO won the elections with their leader Sam 
Nujoma being elected as the President o f Namibia. On 14 November the Special 
Representative o f the Secretary-General declared that the elections were free and fair. 
In April 1990 Namibia joined the United Nations as an independent nation. With the 
inclusion o f new tasks and the emphasis given on civilian operations UNTAG 
foreshadowed the beginning o f a new era in the UN peacekeeping operations where 
the UN could now concentrate on the comprehensive settlement o f disputes rather 
than Just freezing them. Because o f the variety o f tasks peacekeepers undertook in 
Namibia, UNTAG is usually referred to as the first in the new (second) generation o f 
peacekeeping operations.^’
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The final peacekeeping operation o f the period between 1988-1991 took place in 
Central America, where the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) played 
an important role in the peace process that sought to bring stability to the re^on. 
Later on, ONUCA was complemented by the UN Observer Mission to Verify the 
Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) and by the UN Observer Mission in El 
Salvador (ONUSAL).
In 1987 the five Central American states -Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa
Rica and El Salvador- signed the Esquipulas II agreements in which they promised to
"work towards national reconciliation."'** The Esquipulas II agreements committed
each o f these five states a number o f pledges:
The cessation of hostilities; democratization including freedom of the press and 
political pluralism and the ending of states of emergency; the holding of free and 
fair elections; ending support for irregular and insurrectionist forces and the 
prevention of the use of their territory for attacks on other states; and finally, to 
provide s u f^ r t  for refugees and displaced persons.‘^‘^
Thus, ONUCA’s role in this peace process would be to verify that the parties had 
committed themselves in the implementation o f the articles contained in the Esquipulas 
n  agreements. The first prerequisite to the establishment o f a UN peacekeeping 
mission in Central America was the creation o f a secure environment. However, the 
members o f the Nicaraguan Resistance (called as the 'Contras') were continuing their 
attacks against the 'Sandinista' government in Nicaragua fi-om their bases in Honduras. 
Under these circumstances the Secretary-General refiised to "instigate a peacekeeping
1.5 Latín America
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mission until circumstances produced a more conducive environment."***® Fortunately 
the situation was to change with the Nicaraguan government’s declaration to hold 
democratic elections no later than February 1990. In response to the declaration o f the 
Nicaraguan government the four states, which were parties to the Esquipulas II 
agreements, agreed to develop a plan "for the voluntary demobilization, repatriation or 
relocation o f the Nicaraguan resistance and their families."’®' Accordingly, the UN 
Secretary-General agreed to establish the UN Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral 
Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) in accordance with the Nicaraguan government's 
request for the UN to monitor the elections. ONUVEN became operational on 25 
August 1989. Here, it should be pointed out that ONUVEN was not established by the 
Security Council. The Secretary-General, the General Assembly, and the Security 
Council "all wanted to act quickly and seemed ready to let [General] Assembly's vague 
endorsement in earlier resolutions o f UN involvement stand as a sufficient legal and 
political basis for establishing ONTJVEN."*®^ Furthermore, many countries were 
concerned to ensure that election-monitoring on its own was not considered to be 
under the jurisdiction o f the Security Council.'®^
One distinguishing characteristic o f ONUVEN was that it was the first time that the 
UN would observe elections in an independent country. Previously, the UN had 
refused such requests on the grounds that Article 2 (7)'®'* o f the UN Charter prevented 
the UN from intervening in domestic affairs o f states. Another striking hiture o f 
ONUVEN was the cooperation o f the UN with regional organizations, in this case, 
with Organization o f American States (OAS). Prior to the establishment o f ONUVEN
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the secretaries-general o f both the UN and the OAS created an International Support 
and Verification Commission (ClAV) to ensure the fairness o f elections in Nicaragua. 
After the elections CIAV also undertook the responsibility assisting in the 
implementation o f a joint plan for demobilization, repatriation and relocation o f 
members o f the Nicaraguan resistance.'®^
The elections in Nicaragua were held in February 1990 and resulted with the defeat o f 
the ’Sandinista' government. Through close oversight o f Nicaraguan officials at each 
stage o f the elections and throughout the country, ONUVEN directly contributed to 
the electoral process. During the polling ONUVEN deployed 207 observers to monitor 
the elections.
The Secretary-General, on the other hand, recommended the establishment of ONUCA 
to the Security Council following the declaration o f the Nicaraguan government to 
hold democratic elections. Consequently, the Security Council approved the 
established ONUCA through adopting resolution 644 (1989) o f 7 November 1989 the 
mandate o f which was to conduct on-site verification o f the security undertakings 
contained in the Esquipulas II Agreement.'®® Its mandate was expanded to cover the 
voluntary demobilization o f the Nicaraguan contras after the elections held in 
Nicaragua in February 1990. Thus, the UN was for the first time engaging in physical 
disarmament. While ONUCA was responsible for implementing the military aspects of 
demobilization CIAV was responsible for the civilian aspects including "the 
repatriation, relocation and resettlement and subsequent monitoring o f the welfare o f
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members o f the [Nicaraguan] Resistance."'*’^  Once the military aspect o f 
demobilization was complete ONUCA returned to its original mandate o f verifying 
compliance with the Esquipulas II Agreement. In 1992 ONUCA completed its mission 
and withdrew from Central America.
Overlapping ONUCA was the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 
established in May 1991 following a series o f negotiations that took place between the 
government o f El Salvador and the resistance movement Frente Farabundo Marti para 
la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) under the auspices o f the UN Secretary-General.'*** In 
July 1990 the first agreement that the parties achieved was Agreement on Human 
Rights which provided for the establishment o f a UN verification mission "to monitor 
nationwide respect for and the guarantee o f human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
El Salvador "'**** Although the peacekeeping mission was to be established only after 
the parties agreed to cessation o f the conflict both parties requested the Secretary- 
General to set up the mission even before a cease-fire was achieved. Thus, the 
Secretary-General sent a preliminary mission to El Salvador in March 1991. The 
operation officially became operational on 20 May 1991 through Security Council 
resolution 693 (1991) the mandate of which was to monitor all agreements concluded 
between the Government o f El Salvador and FMLN. The initial mandate, thus, only 
comprised the human rights verification. At this stage, the tasks o f ONUSAL included 
"investigating specific cases o f alleged human rights violations; promoting human 
rights in the country; making recommendations for the elimination o f violations; and 
reporting on these matters to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the UN
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General Assembly and Security C o u n c i l . " I n  addition to investigating allegations o f 
human rights violations, identifying and punishing those who are responsible for such 
crimes ONUSAL also initiated a human rights education program together with an 
information campaign on human rights.
Subsequent agreements reached between the parties in December 1991 and in January
1992 necessitated the enlargement o f ONUSAL's mandate so as to cover military and
civilian police aspects o f the agreements. While the human rights division continued to
perform its tasks the military division was responsible for
verifying the cessation of the armed conflict, dealing with the redeployment of the 
Aimed Forces of El Salvador to the positions they would maintain in normal peace 
time, and the concentration of the FMLN forces in agreed "designated locations” in 
the areas of conflict. Its function was to monitor the troops of both parties in these 
locations, verify the inventories of weapons and personnel, authorize and 
accompany the movements of both forces, and receive and investigate complaints of 
violations.'"
In addition to these responsibilities the military division also helped control and 
coordinate the clearing o f425 minefields.
The police division, on the other hand, was responsible for the creation o f a new 
Salvadorian police force and maintenance o f public order and security until the 
National Civil Police became operational. The police division also assumed additional 
responsibilities when the new National Police began to deploy throughout the territory 
o f El Salvador in March 1993. The division carried out an evaluation o f the 
performance o f the new police force in the field and provided it with technical advice 
and logistical suppiort between April and September 1993.“ ^
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ONUSAL's mandate was again enlarged after the Government o f El Salvador 
requested the UM to observe the elections that were to be held in March 1994. Thus, 
the Security Council, through resolution 832 (1993) o f 27 May 1993, enlarged 
ONUSAL's mandate to cover the observation o f the electoral process. The 
responsibilities o f electoral division, which would be implemented in five stages, were 
to verify citizens' registration and to follow political activities, to observe the electoral 
campaign, to observe the elections, to count the votes and announce the results."^ For 
these purposes ONUSAL deployed 900 electoral observers. The elections were held 
on 20 March 1994 and the next day the Special Representative o f the Secretary- 
General stated that, in the light of the information gathered by the observers on 
election day, and view o f the systematic observation o f the electoral process over the 
preceding six months, ONUSAL believed that in general the elections had taken place 
under appropriate conditions in terms o f freedom, competitiveness and security."^ He 
also pointed out that ONUSAL observers had not recorded any frauds that could have 
had a significant impact on the outcome o f the elections. Since no candidate in the 
presidential election obtained an absolute majority a second round o f elections were 
held on 24 April 1994. Although ONUSAL's mandate was to be terminated following 
the elections the Secretary-General requested the Security Council that its duration 
should be extended for another 6 months because the implementation o f the peace 
accords, especially the police division was not complete. Thus, the Security Council 
extended the mandate o f ONUSAL for a period o f sk  months.
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These five peacekeeping operations that had been conducted between 1988-1991 point 
out to radical changes in the nature o f peacekeeping. During the Cold War 
peacekeeping was relatively limited in terms o f responsibilities it had to assume 
because both the Soviet Union and the United States were not really interested in 
addressing the root causes o f the conflicts but rather preventing their escalation. With 
the changes that occurred in the Soviet and American policies towards the end o f the 
1980s both powers were now willing to engage not only in peacekeeping but also 
peacemaking. Therefore, the UN assumed multidimensional tasks in its peacekeeping 
activities with the aim o f settling long lasting regional conflicts. The responsibilities o f 
new UN peacekeeping included election monitoring, physical disaiming o f political 
factions, police activities (including training), human rights, assisting in mine clearance 
and repatriation o f refugees and displaced persons. Thus the cooperation o f the great 
powers in the Security Council enabled the UN to take more active steps towards long 
term settlements. One new feature o f the new UN peacekeeping was that the UN 
helped the implementation o f the agreements concluded by states who needed an 
impartial body to verify that the terms o f the agreements are carried out properly. 
Thus, the UN could operate in an environment where the conflicting parties themselves 
had already committed themselves to settling their disputes, which enabled the UN to 
perform its tasks in a more peaceful environment. Another unique feature o f the new 
UN peacekeeping was that the nature o f conflicts began to reflect that o f a an internal 
one. In other words, the UN established peacekeeping missions not only on the 
borders o f states but also within their borders the aim o f which was to achieve national
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reconciliation. As a result besides the emergence o f new tasks for UN peacekeepers 
the environment in which they operated began to change as well.
2. Moving From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Gulf War
The consensus in the Security Council that began to reveal itself at the end o f the 
1980s reached its peak during the Gulf crisis to avert Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. 
The operation launched against Iraq was not a peacekeeping operation hence it was 
conducted under Chapter VII o f the UN Charter. Furthermore, it did not qualify as a 
collective security action under Article 42 o f the UN Charter since the UN lacked such 
a collective security mechanism to deal with crises as laid out in Chapter VII o f the UN 
Charter. Rather, the operation was launched by the US-led multinational coalition, 
which bore some resemblance to the Korean War forty years ago. But this time the 
coalition forces did not use UN flags and symbols. Nor was the United States 
responsible to the authority o f the UN through regular reporting and participation by 
UN personnel in decisionmaking."^
Iraq's invasion o f Kuwait on 2 August 1990 prompted strong international reaction 
against this aggression. The Security Council immediately responded to the Iraqi 
invasion and, acting under Chapter VII o f the UN Charter, adopted resolution 660 
(1990) on the same day stating that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait constituted a breach 
o f international peace and security. Furthermore, the Council condemned the Iraqi 
invasion and demanded its immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. The
57
Council also "call[ed] upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive 
negotiations for the resolution o f their differences and support[ed] aU efforts in this 
regard, and especially those o f the League o f Arab States.""^ The Arab League, 
however, failed to mediate a solution that would alter Iraqi behavior. Thus, the 
Security Council met once again and decided to impose mandatory sanctions against 
Iraq (excluding humanitarian supplies)."^ Iraq responded to the Security Council's 
decision by annexing Kuwait as the nineteenth province. Despite the fact that there had 
been territorial claims or border disputes throughout the globe it was the first time in 
the history o f the LTN that a state had forcibly annexed another. The Security Council 
stated that the annexation o f Kuwait was null and void and called "upon all States, 
international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, 
and to refrain from any action o f dealing that [would] be interpreted as an indirect 
recognition o f the annexation."” * The Security Council further imposed a maritime 
blockade on 25 August with resolution 665 (1990). Following the maritime blockade 
the Security Council took measures in order to supply food and medical supplies in 
cooperation with the Committee o f the Red Cross or other humanitarian agencies. 
Thus, fi'om August until November 1990 the Security Council adopted a series o f 
resolutions in order to bring an end to Iraqi invasion. However, neither the sanctions 
nor the mediation o f efforts o f the UN and the Arab League brought any positive 
outcome. Therefore, the Security Council, on 29 November 1990 adopted resolution 
678 (1990) and stated,
1. (the Security Council) demands that Iraq comply fiilly with resolution 660
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining
all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final o|^rtim ity, as a pause of goodwill, to
do so;
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2. Authorizes Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless 
Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 iiilly implements ... the foregoing 
resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 
(1990) ... to restore international peace and security in the area;
.3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in 
pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution.'^®
However, Iraq failed to comply with the Security Council resolution and on 16 January 
1991 the US-led coalition began the air campaign against Iraq, which was called as the 
Operation Desert Storm. The air raids continued for six weeks in which the coalition 
forces destroyed most o f Iraq's air power and the infrastructure o f the country. The 
operation continued with the launching o f the Operation Desert Sabre, the land phase, 
on 24 February. The operation lasted three days and by that time Kuwait was cleared 
o f Iraqi occupation. On 28 February the cease-fire came into effect. With the goal o f 
expelling Iraq from Kuwait achieved attention turned again to the Security Council to 
set the conditions for peace with a long series o f resolutions.
On 2 March 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 686 (1991) which set out 
steps to consolidate the cease-fire. The Security Council demanded that all 12 UN 
resolutions that had been adopted prior to the Operation Desert Storm were to be 
unconditionally accepted by Iraq, all hostile actions cease immediately and that the 
prisoners were to be exchanged and released. The following month the Security 
Council adopted resolution 687 (1991), which is, in some UN circles, referred to as the 
"mother o f  all resolutions"*^', containing 34 paragraphs which laid down the conditions 
under which sanctions would be lifted, and military presence by the allies would be 
ended.
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First o f all, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to establish a UN 
observer mission to monitor the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq and a 
demilitarized zone.*^ The Security Council unanimously agreed to the establishment o f 
UN Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) the mandate o f which was to report on 
violations o f  the demilitarized zone and investigate complaints on alleged violations o f 
the cease-fire. This was the first observer mission that included personnel fi^om all the 
Permanent Members o f the Security Council. Furthermore, although an observer 
mission in the traditional sense, what distinguished UNIKOM fi-om other observer 
missions was the fact that it was not established with the consent o f the host state, that 
is, Iraq. Initially the mission was composed o f unarmed observers, but in the face of a 
series o f border violations the Security Council, in Fdjruary 1993, "decided to increase 
UNlKOM’s strength and to extend its terms o f reference to include the capacity to take 
physical action to prevent violations o f the demilitarized zone and o f the ... 
demarcated boundaiy between Iraq and Kuwait."’^  ^UNIKOM is still active today with 
1,102 military personnel operating along the border and the demilitarized zone 
between Iraq and Kuwait.
Secondly, the Security Council established a Special Committee for the destruction o f
chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles, which represented a
further innovation in enforcement for the purpose o f maintaining peace and security in
the region. The Commission's mandate comprised the following:
To carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile 
capabilities; to take possession for destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all 
chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related sub-systems 
and components and all research, development, suH»n and manufacturing 
facilities; to supervise the destruction by Iraq of all its ballistic missiles with a range
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greater than 150 km and related major parts, and repair and production Cacilities; 
and to monitor and verify Iraq's compliance with its undertaking not to use, develop, 
construct or acquire any of the items specified above.'^''
The Security Council also authorized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
to inspect and destroy known and suspected nuclear facilities and materials. 
However, both the Special Committee and the IAEA faced difficulties while carrying 
out their investigations because o f Iraq's non-cooperative attitude and denial o f access 
to documents and buildings. Iraq's consistent policy has been, very simply, to save 
what it could o f these weapons by declaring the existence only o f what was already 
known and using the full range o f human ingenuity to conceal the rest.’^ * 
Consequently, the Commission and the IAEA have not progressed much on this issue, 
which has been the major reason for the continuance o f sanctions on Iraq still today.
Thirdly, the Security Council made Iraq liable, under the international law, for "any 
direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion o f natural 
resources, or injury to foreign Government, nationals and corporations. For this 
purpose the Council created a fund to compensate these losses which would be drawn 
partly from Iraq's petroleum revenues. The economic sanctions on Iraq would 
continue, excluding food and medical supplies.
In addition to establishing the above-mentioned measures the Security Council, for the 
first time in the history o f the UN linked humanitarian and security issues. The Council 
adopted resolution 688 (1991) in which it condemned Iraq's repression o f its 
minorities, especially the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq, "which led to a massive
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flow o f refugees towards and across international fi’ontiers and to cross-border 
incursions"’^ * and thus threatened international peace and security in the region. For 
the purpose o f protecting the Kurdish minority the Security Council decided to 
establish Operation Provide Comfort the aim o f which would be to set up safe havens 
(in the north o f the 36* parallel) for the Kurdish population in northern Iraq and 
authorized the non-governmental agencies to offer assistance. A subsequent resolution 
o f the Security Council established a no-fly zone over southern Iraq to protect the 
Shi'ite population there. Although resolution 688 (1991) did not refer to Chapter VII 
o f the UN Charter, given the overwhelming power o f the allied forces Iraq had to 
acquiesce the Council's decision though in protest o f the violation o f its national 
sovereignty. This was for the first time the Security Covmcil made an unprecedented 
intervention in the domestic affairs o f a sovereign member state.
The Gulf War therefore represents a turning point in the history o f the UN. It was the 
first time since the Korean War that the UN Security Council could use its 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII o f the UN Charter to such an unprecedented 
degree. But this time both the Soviet Union and the United States were cooperating 
with each other and not using their veto power, their most important political weapon 
in the Security Council. Without the cooperation o f the great powers it would be very 
difficult if not impossible to bring an end to the Iraqi aggression in such a short time 
and in such a decisive manner. During the Cold War many conflicts that could be 
termed as aggression remained unaddressed in the UN because the conflicts were in 
the spheres o f influence o f either the United States or the Soviet Union which had been
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the reason for the birth o f peacekeeping. Although not a collective security action as 
envisaged in the UN Charter the Gulf War signaled the beginning o f a new era where 
the Security Council could now reassume its role as the guarantor o f international 
peace and security.
Although the UN proved to be successful in achieving its stated goal, that is, to bring 
an end to Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait the way that this goal was achieved has been 
exposed to criticism. First and foremost Operation Desert Storm was not undertaken 
by the UN itself Under Article 43 o f the UN Charter the Military Staff Committee was 
to conclude agreements with the Member States in order to make militaiy forces 
available to the UN for use by the Security Council. However, these agreements were 
never concluded because o f the Cold War. Therefore the UN acquired no military 
troops at its disposal that it could quickly send to areas o f conflict. During the Cold 
War, when the UN was to establish a peacekeeping operation it had to rely on 
voluntary troop contributions from its members. Consequently the UN was caught 
unprepared for the Gulf crisis leaving it with no option than to delegate its enforcement 
powers to a coalition o f 28 nations under the United States command. As a result, 
“between January 15 and March 2 the UN faded from the picture as U S.-led bombing 
raids and ground action forced Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.” '^  Lacking a direct link 
to the UN, most UN members had no say in the operation. Germany and Japan, which 
were expected to contribute monetary resources for the collective action, were 
excluded from important decision making meetings.’ *^’ Therefore, the operation 
showed the UN’s weakness in conducting a collective security action under its
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command and was criticized because o f American dominance o f the operation. Within 
this framework “the Gulf War highlighted an important problem o f the post-Cold War 
era: The ambivalence o f many states toward a stronger UN [was] now coupled with 
apprehension about a pax Americana, even a UN-centered one, without a Soviet 
counterweight. ” ’ ^  ’
Another criticism o f the Gulf War was related to the use o f force by the US-led 
coalition. Resolution 678 remained very vague and did not establish any restrictions on 
the what kind of, how much and how long force could be used, but only authorized 
“all necessary means” to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Therefore, the United States was left 
with a blank check to pursue the expulsion o f Iraq.^^^ Furthermore, it was argued that 
the UN resorted to force without really taking sufficient time to see whether the 
sanctions were effective or not. In this respect, the goal o f Chapter VII o f the UN 
Charter is action short o f force if possible. However, the Security Council moved too 
quickly from sanctions to use o f force without a formal determination as to the 
inadequacy o f sanctions before Operation Desert Storm was launched.” '^^
In addition to these criticisms the Gulf crisis posed serious questions regarding national 
sovereignty o f states. As mentioned earlier it was the first time that the UN had 
intervened in domestic affairs o f a state in a such unprecedented degree through setting 
up safe havens for the Kurdish population in northern Iraq for humanitarian concerns. 
The developing states, for example, although supporting the action, worried about 
precedents for UN interference in states’ internal a f f a i r s . I n d e e d  subsequent UN
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peacekeeping operations which included a humanitarian dimension such as in Somalia 
and Bosnia further witnessed the erosion o f national sovereignty o f states. 
Consequently, although hailed as a success the Gulf experience posed serious 
questions about the UN’s ability to deal with similar cases o f aggression in the hiture.
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CONCLUSION:
With the failure o f the League o f Nations to preserve international peace and security 
the victorious powers o f World War II sought the creation o f a more powerful and 
efficient system o f collective security. Consequently, on October 24, 1945 the United 
Nations was established as a follow-up o f the League o f Nations. With the creation of 
a smaller executive body (i.e. the Security Council) that was empowered to take 
binding decisions upon the member states the United Nations was envisaged to play a 
more effective role in dealing with international crises where urgent decisions needed 
to be taken. The UN relied on two sets o f actions to ensure the maintenance o f 
international peace and security. In the first place the conflicting states would seek a 
solution through peaceful means such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation or judicial 
settlement as outlined in Chapter VI o f the UN Charter. The second set o f actions 
referred to cases where there were threats to peace, breaches o f the peace or acts o f 
aggression. In such cases the Security Council was authorized to take a wide range of 
actions, from imposing sanctions to enforcement, to restore international peace and 
security. However, the alliance o f the communist East and democratic West that 
helped to win a victory over the Nazis would not last long. The world would soon be 
stumbled into two ideologically rival blocs that could not be foreseen by the creators o f 
the UN. Soon the ideological differences began to reveal themselves which would 
paralyze the UN system o f collective security. The world had entered a new period, the 
Cold War, where either the United States or the Soviet Union would block each move 
that they perceived to be harmful to their ideological interests. The first test case which
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helped the world to see that the collective security mechanism would not work in the 
future was the Korean War. At the beginning o f the war the Security CouncU took the 
opportunity o f utilizing Chapter VII o f the UN Charter against the communist North 
Korea because o f the absence o f the Soviet delegate in the Council. Once the Soviets 
returned to their seat in the Security Council the Council was paralyzed with the veto. 
Thus, the only way to continue with the operation was through the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution which enabled the General Assembly to take responsibility if the Security 
Council was deadlocked by a veto. Unlike the Security Council the General Assembly 
could only recommend measures in cases that threatened international peace and 
security.
The first case o f enforcement under the UN thus clearly indicated that no such action 
would be possible in the fiiture as long as the ideological rivalry o f the great powers 
would be the determining factor in international politics. Hence the UN, for forty 
years, could not resort to Chapter VII even though there were a number o f cases 
which required enforcement action. From then on the UN had to resort to something 
different, something not envisioned in the UN Charter for the maintenance o f 
international peace and security, that is, conducting peacekeeping operations.
The term peacekeeping was not mentioned in the UN Charter. Rather it was an 
innovative response to the deadlock in the Security Council. The first force level 
peacekeeping operation was established during the Suez crisis o f 1956 in which the 
key principles o f peacekeeping had been laid down. The innovation o f peacekeeping
67
provided a valuable means for limiting superpower involvement in regional conflicts 
(with their consent) and coping with the threats to peace and security posed by the 
emergence o f new states, border conflicts among those states, and intractable conflicts 
in the Middle East.’^^  The peacekeepers operated on three basic principles namely the 
consent o f the host state, impartiality o f the UN peacekeeping force and non-use o f 
force except in self-defense. Because no aggressor was singled out for blame the 
peacekeepers operated in a relatively peaceful environment. IXiring the Cold War the 
tasks o f peacekeepers were limited to containing regional conflicts so as to prevent a 
direct clash o f superpowers. With the lack o f the superpowers’ political will to utilize 
the collective security mechanism peacekeeping served at least to stop conflicts in 
various parts o f the world while not providing long lasting solutions to the underlying 
crises.
Towards the end o f the 1980s, with the re-emergence o f cooperation between the 
superpowers in the Security Council provided by the change o f the Sovaet foreign 
policy, the UN was able to establish a number o f peacekeeping operations which 
proved to have a different nature than the ones established previously. With the 
acquiescence o f the non-permanent members and new collaboration between the 
Security Council and the Secretary-General, UN peacekeepers chalked up a series o f 
successes that led to the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.^^ Thus, as John Mackinlay and 
Jarat Chopra argue,
the end ot the Cold War established new parameters and removed many political 
tensions that had limited the scope and application of peacekeeping. Although the 
national interests of the superpowers were still vigorously maintained, their destructive
1.37zero-sum game was abandoned in many theaters.
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The cooperation o f the superpowers enabled the UN to tackle long lasting regional 
conflicts. Rather than only separating the belligerents the UN was also addressing the 
root causes o f the underlying disputes in order to achieve long lasting solutions hence 
the most important obstacle to the proper functioning o f the UN (ideological struggles 
o f the superpowers) had been eliminated. Therefore the UN peacekeepers could 
acquire additional tasks with an emphasis on civilian components rather than the 
military ones. The additional tasks o f the UN peacekeepers comprised election 
monitoring, verification o f human rights, assisting in mine clearance, civilian police 
functions, physical disarming of armed insurgents. The environment in which the UN 
operated began to change as well. During the Cold War the UN usually dealt with 
inter-state conflicts, but now the emphasis was given on internal conflicts with the aim 
o f putting an end to civil wars.
Between 1988 and 1991 the UN established five peacekeeping operations which were 
aimed at settling long lasting regional conflicts. The UN provided a face-saving way 
for the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops fi'om Afghanistan while it was able to bring 
an end to the war between Iran and Iraq that had been lasting for ten years. 
Furthermore, the UN was able to bring independence to Namibia, which was 
administered by South Africa. Lastly, the UN established the UN Observer Group in 
Central America to help the five Central American states to implement the peace 
agreements that they had previously agreed upon. Through the implementation o f the 
peace agreements the UN would be able to bring peace to the region that had been 
ruined by civil wars for almost a decade. For this purpose the UN established a mission
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in Nicaragua to help that country for a peaceful transition through holding democratic 
elections. The UN also established a mission in El Salvador the purpose o f which was 
to bring an end to the long lasting civil war and achieve national reconciliation in that 
country.
The first enforcement action after the Korean War was the Operation Desert Storm 
which had been undertaken to revert Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. The UN 
successfully reverted Iraqi aggression within a relatively short time due to the absence 
o f Cold War struggles in the Security Council. The operation, however, showed the 
UN’s weakness in its operational structure because o f the fact that it again had to rely 
on a group o f states, as it did forty years ago in Korea, to enforce the decisions o f the 
Security Council.
Hence peacekeeping, which started out as an iimovation proved to be the most 
valuable conflict resolution tool for the UN during the Cold War. With the end o f the 
Cold War the UN could return to Chapter VI and VII o f the UN Charter for the 
resolution o f conflicts. However, peacekeeping has proved so useful that UN had 
extended the scope o f peacekeeping to cover peacemaking and peacebuilding with the 
acquisition o f additional responsibilities. Rather than abandoning such a useftil 
mechanism the UN should work towards improving peacekeeping to be able to 
eliminate the problems that it has been consistently facing due to its ad hoc nature.
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